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Cho: Pollution Property Damage

CASE SUMMARY
DIRTY PROPERTY FOR DIRT CHEAP:
CGL COVERAGE FOR THE
DIMINISHED VALUE OF
CONTAMINATED SITES UNDER
GOODSTEIN V. CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY CO.
INTRODUCTION

In Goodstein v. Continental Casualty CO.,l the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the diminution in sale value of
property due to pollution does not constitute "property damage" under a
comprehensive general liability insurance policy where the sale contract
did not require the buyer to remediate as a condition of the sale. 2 In so
holding, the court found that diminished property value is not "physical
injury to tangible property," nor is it "damage" that the "insured shall
become legally obligated to pay" because of "property damage.,,3
However, without determining whether the mere designation of property
as environmentally contaminated by the Washington State Department of
Ecology is a "suit," the Ninth Circuit held that such classification may
still trigger the insurer's duty to defend. 4

Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007).
2 1d. at 1046.
3 1d. at 1054.
4 See id. at 1055.
I
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

THE STERNOFF PROPERTIES

532

Partnerships comprised of members of the Sternoff family jointly
owned two industrial properties in Washington: a three-acre site on
Marginal Way ("the Marginal property") in Seattle and a twelve-acre site
in Renton ("the Renton property,,).5 For forty-five years, the Sternoffs
operated a scrap metal salvage yard at the Marginal property that caused
ground pollution. 6 For approximately twenty years, the Sternoffs
recycled scrap metal and electrical equipment at the Renton property,
resulting in hazardous waste byproducts containing high concentrations
of soluble lead. 7 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Washington State
Department of Ecology ("DOE") identified the two properties as
environmentally contaminated, and listed them as hazardous sites under
the Model Toxics Control Act of Washington ("MTCA,,). 8
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Sternoff partners had a series of
disagreements among themselves, and they were unable to continue
operating their various businesses. 9 On March 29, 1990, the King
County Superior Court dissolved the partnerships and appointed Robert
Goodstein ("Goodstein") as receiver to liquidate the partnership assets. 10
The court allowed Goodstein to proceed with remediation of the
contaminated properties as necessary or to sell the properties without
remediation. ll Goodstein presented two options to the receivership
court: (1) sell the properties at a discounted sales price "as is" to account
for the pollution, or (2) remediate the pollution and then sell the
properties. 12 The court approved a plan to sell the two properties "as
is.,,13

5/d. at 1046; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805).
6 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046.
7/d.
S The Model Toxics Control Act of Washington imposes strict liability for the remediation
of environmental hazards upon any person who owned or operated a facility at which hazardous
substances were released. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.l05D.040 CHECK BB FORMAT ON TillS); see
also Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046 n.2 (citing Olds-Olympic, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 918
P.2d 923, 927 (Wash. 1996)).
9 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046.
10 /d.; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042
(9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805).
II Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046.
12 [d. at 1047.

13

[d.
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In 1996, Goodstein sold the Renton property for $3,001,000, and in
1998, he sold the Marginal property for $500,000. 14 The sales
agreements disclosed that both properties were polluted and required the
purchasers to assume responsibility for any cleanup that may be
required. IS Both agreements also provided that "[no] amendment,
change or modification of [the agreements] shall be valid, unless in
writing and signed by the parties hereto.,,16 However, the agreements did
not commit the purchasers to remediate the properties on their own. 17
B.

THE INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE POLICIES

Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial") issued primary and
excess insurance policies to the Sternoffs between 1980 and 1986. 18 The
initial coverage grants in these Comprehensive General Liability
("CGL") policies 19 state that "[Industrial] will pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of [property damage]" to which this insurance
applies .. 20 Under the policies, Industrial assumed "the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such ... property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent.,,21 Further, "the policies required the
Sternoffs to provide written notice of an 'occurrence' to Industrial 'as
soon as practicable,' and, in the event a claim or suit is asserted against
the Sternoffs, to 'immediately forward' to Industrial all 'demand, notice,
summons or other process' received by the Sternoffs.'.22 The policies
defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in ... property damage

14

[d.

15

[d.

16

[d.

17

Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).

18

[d.

19 Comprehensive General Liability policies provide general liability coverage for
commercial and business entities. In 1986, the revision of the CGL standard policy eliminated the
word "comprehensive" and substituted it with "commercial." Although both use the acronym
"CGL" and are called "CGL policies," there are significant coverage differences between the two.
NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 30-24 (Leo Martinez, Marc S. Mayerson &
Douglas R. Richmond eds., 2007).
20 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1047; see also Appellees' Response Brief at 4, Goodstein v. Cont'l
Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805).
21 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1047.

22/d.
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neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.,,23 The
policies did not define "damages," "claim." or "suit.,,24
C.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOODSTEIN AND INDUSTRIAL

On September 28, 1990, Goodstein notified Industrial by letter that
the Washington DOE had identified the Marginal and Renton properties
as contaminated and that a study was underway to assess the damage and
cleanup costS. 25 Goodstein requested copies of the relevant policies and
stated that "Sternoff may make a claim for cleanup and related costs
under the insurance policies.,,26 On October, 19, 1990, Industrial
acknowledged receipt of the claim27 and indicated that it was attempting
to find the Sternoff policies. 28
On October 22, 1990, Goodstein acknowledged receipt of
Industrial's October 19, 1990 letter, but stated: "Please note, however, in
case there is any confusion, we are not presently making any claims
under th[ else policies. At present, we are simply asking to obtain copies
of any policies, applications, etc. relating to insurance provided by
Industrial Indemnity to Sternoff.,,29 Industrial did not receive any further
correspondence regarding the Sternoff policies and in December 1992,
closed the file for "lack of activity.,,3o Because no claim was filed,
Industrial did not issue a coverage position letter to Goodstein. 31
On September 25, 1998, eight years after Goodstein indicated to
Industrial that he was "not presently making any claims," Goodstein
notified Industrial of the sale of the Renton and Marginal properties. 32 In
that letter, Goodstein also stated that the extent of the contamination of
the properties had been investigated and that he was now in a position to
settle the environmental claims related to those properties. 33 Goodstein
then demanded payment of $473,000 for the loss on the Marginal

23/d.
24/d.
25

1d.

at 1047-1048 (emphasis in original).
Internal documents indicated that Industrial understood the September 28, 1990 letter to be
asserting a claim for the cleanup and other related costs; see Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d
1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007).
261d.

27

28/d.
29 /d.

at 1048 (emphasis in origi nal).

Id.
31
1d.
32 1d.
30

33

Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007).
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property and $4.839 million for the loss on the Renton property.34 These
amounts were calculated based on the "appraised value of the sites if
uncontaminated less the sales price of the sites in their contaminated
condition.,,35 Industrial responded by disclaiming any coverage under
the policies for the losses claimed by Goodstein on behalf of the
Sternoffs. 36

D.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2002, Goodstein filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
"Industrial owed a duty to defend and to indemnify Goodstein under the
CGL policies, and ... for breach of contract based on Industrial's failure
to fulfill those duties.,,37 Industrial moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the claimed losses from the property sales were not covered
by the policies and that Goodstein never invoked the duty to defend. 38
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Goodstein offered a
declaration as evidence that he had entered into an oral cross-assignment
agreemene 9 with Zelman Renton LLC ("Zelman"), the purchaser of the
Renton property.40 The declaration stated that the cross-assignment
agreement had "not yet been finalized. ,,41 Goodstein did not submit any
evidence of the transfer and cross-transfer of rights in support of his
opposition to summary judgment. 42
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted Industrial's motion for summary judgment, finding
that Industrial did not have a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify
Goodstein under the pOlicies. 43 The court did not consider the evidence
purporting to establish the cross-assignment of rights. 44
Goodstein filed a motion for reconsideration along with a written
cross-assignment agreement and a new declaration, stating that "all the
material terms [of the cross-assignment agreement] had been negotiated
ld.
1d.
36 .
1d
37 1d.
34
35

1d. at 1048-49.
39 Goodstein and Zelman agreed that all rights that Goodstein had to insurance coverage for
environmental contamination would be transferred to Zelman, and Zelman would transfer those
rights back to Goodstein; see Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007).
40 Id.
41
1d.
42 1d.
43
1d.
38

44

ld.
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by, agreed to, and known to the parties as of January 27, 2005.'.45 The
district court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that
Goodstein failed to comply with the local rules governing such
motions. 46 On appeal, Goodstein challenged the district court's failure to
consider the cross-assignment evidence at the summary judgment and
reconsideration stages, as well as the court's grant of summary judgment
for Industrial on Goodstein's duty to defend and duty to indemnify
c1aims. 47

II.

NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

A.

CONSIDERATION OF CRosS-ASSIGNMENT EVIDENCE

The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by rejecting Goodstein's
assertion that his declaration properly served as evidence of the crossassignment of rights between Zelman and Goodstein. 48 Goldstien
purported that the purpose of the agreement, was "to ensure that all rights
to insurance coverage for environmental damage at the Renton site
[were] consolidated and assigned to the Receiver,,,49 and to "put to rest
any argument that the claim for coverage was an 'economic loss' and not
covered damages under the policies.,,50
While Washington law allows the assignment of insurance rights,51
the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to consider evidence of the cross-assignment. 52 First,
contrary to Goodstein's assertion, the declaration did not state that the
parties had reached a definitive agreement. 53 Second, the agreement
Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007).
46 ld.; see infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
45

1d.
48 See id. at 1050. Because the policies at issue provide coverage for third-party liability and
47

not first-party injury, the insurer is only liable for such damages that "the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay" to a third-party; see id. at 1052. Therefore, in order to avail himself of the
coverage provided by the policies, Goodstein entered into the cross-assignment agreement with
Zelman; see id. at 1049. Third-party insurance covers the insured for liability it incurs to another
party, while first-party insurance provides coverage for injury to the insured's own property; see
Olds-Olympic, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 923, 930 (Wash. 1996) (citing
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994)).
49 See Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007).
50 Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 05-35805).
51 See Public Utility Dist. No. I of Klickitat County v. Int'l Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1027
(Wash. 1994) (holding that an assignment of insurance rights is valid "if made after the events
giving rise to liability have already occurred when the assignment is made.").
52 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1050.
53

[d.
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executed by Goodstein and Zelman, which the cross-assignment sought
to modify, provided that "[no] amendment, change or modification of
[the agreements] shall be valid, unless in writing, and signed by the
parties hereto.,,54 Lastly, the declaration did not disclose the essential
terms of the cross-assignment agreement, including the consideration
that supported the agreement. 55
The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court properly declined
to reverse its summary judgment ruling upon Goodstein's motion for
reconsideration. 56 In support of his motion, Goodstein asserted that
although the cross-assignment agreement was not memorialized in
writing when he submitted the original declaration in opposition to
summary judgment, "all the material terms had been negotiated by,
agreed to, and known to the parties as of January 27, 2005.,,57 The
district court, however, ruled that Goodstein failed to meet the standard
laid out in the local rules. 58 Local Rule 7(h) of the Western District of
Washington provides that motions for reconsideration will only be
granted upon a "showing of new facts ... which could not have been
brought to [the court's] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.,,59
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that Goodstein's
motion "fails of its own weight.,,6o The panel held that according to
Goodstein's motion, the precise terms of the cross-assignment agreement
were agreed to and known to the parties, and therefore, could have been
brought to the district court's attention in January of 2005. 61 As such,
Goodstein failed to meet the standard imposed by Local Rule 7(h).62
Because it concluded that the district court properly declined to consider
evidence of the cross-assignment, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the
possible impact of the cross-assignment agreement on Goodstein's
substantive claims for coverage under the CGL policies. 63
B.

DIMINISHED VALUE OF PROPERTY AS COVERED DAMAGES

The Ninth Circuit next considered Goodstein's assertion that
Industrial had a duty to indemnify Goodstein for the difference between
1d. at 1047 (alteration in original).
1d. at 1050.
56 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 FJd 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
57 1d.
58 1d.
59 W.O. Wash. Local R. 7(h) (cited in Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1051) (alteration in original).
60 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1051.
61
1d.
62
1d.
63 1d.
54
55
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the sale price of the polluted properties and the fair market value of the
land had it been remediated prior to the sale. 64 Goodstein argued that the
diminution in value of the land due to the pollution is the "functional
approximation" of the cost to remediate the properties and as such,
should be covered under a CGL pOlicy.65 While the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court's conclusion that the policy did not provide for
indemnity of such costs, it disagreed with the rationale asserted by the
district court in reaching that conclusion. 66
The district court found that the policy provision that required
Industrial to pay all sums "on behalf of the insured," rather than to the
insured, must be read literally.67 Therefore, the policy required Industrial
to provide indemnity to the insured only for another's loss, not for the
insured's own loss.68
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the district court's strict
adherence to the distinction between fIrst and third-party insurance. 69
Relying on Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO.,70 the Ninth
Circuit found that the Washington Supreme Court "has demonstrated a
marked willingness to take a view of policy language in the context of
insurance coverage for environmental cleanup claims suffIciently
expansive to preclude such literalism.,,7l Interpreting a CGL policy
identical to the one in Goodstein, the Washington Supreme Court held in
Boeing that a third-party liability policy does cover remediation costs,
even though the insurer was to pay the insured for costs incurred. 72
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that "Goodstein's claim cannot fail
simply because it is not a request for a payment made to a harmed third
party.'.73
However, the Goodstein court found that the diminished sale value
of the polluted property was not the "functional approximation" of
remediation costS. 74 First, the sales contracts for the two properties did
not require the buyer to remediate the pollution as a condition of the

64

ld.

65

[d. at lOS2.

66

See Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., S09 F.3d 1042, 10S1 (9th CiT. 2007).

67

[d. at IOS2.

See id.
[d. at IOSI-S2.
70 Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & SUT. Co., 784 P.2d S07 (Wash. 1990) (en bane).
71 Goodstein, S09 F.3d at 10S2.
72 Boeing, 784 P.2d at S16; see also Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., S09 F.3d 1042, 10S2 (9th
CiT. 2007).
73 Goodstein, S09 F.3d at 10S2.
74 See id.
68

ff)
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sale. 75 On the contrary, records showed that while one of the properties
was cleaned up by the buyer, the other remained polluted almost ten
years after the sale and over fifteen years after it was first identified as
contaminated. 76
Second, the court concluded that the reduced purchase price
represented a calculation based on the probable cost of remediation
discounted by the probability that the costs would actually be incurred. 77
"The reduction in price for the cleanup costs was thus almost surely not
equivalent in amount to the present cost of prompt cleanup.,,7s
Lastly, diminution in sale value alone, the court stated, cannot
constitute "property damage" where the policy language requires
"physical injury to tangible property.,,79 While clean up costs incurred in
response to environmental agency action can constitute "property
damage,"SO Washington courts "have never extended such interpretation
to include diminution in property value as a surrogate for response costs
never incurred.,,81 Further, Goodstein did not "constructively" incur
costs for remediation when the sale was not conditioned on remediation
by the buyer using the money saved from the diminished purchase
.
82
pnce.
In support of his position, Goodstein cited two Washington
Supreme Court cases that held that response costs could constitute
"property damage" under similar CGL policies: 1) Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., noted above, and 2) Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety CO. 83 In Boeing, the Washington Supreme Court
considered whether environmental response costs paid by the insured as
a result of actions by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA,,)84 constituted "damages" within the meaning
of the CGL policies issued by the insurers. 85 Applying Washington's
"plain meaning rule,,,86 the Boeing court held that response costs incurred
1d.
76 See id. at 1053.
77 See id.
78 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007).
79 1d. at 1054.
75

80 See id. (citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 145 (Wash.
1994)(en bane); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 5 IS (Wash. 1990) (en bane)).
81 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1054.
82 ld.
83 See id. at 1052.
84 42 U.S.C.A § 9601 (West 2008).
85 See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. 1990) (en bane).
86 See id. at 511 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 549 P.2d 9, 11 (Wash. 1976)) ("Undefined
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under CERCLA are "damages" to the extent that those costs were
incurred "because of' property damage within the meaning of the CGL
policies. 87
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO.,88 the
Washington Supreme Court took Boeing a step further and held that
where the insured incurred response costs based on liability imposed by
an environmental statute, those costs are "damages" within the meaning
of a CGL policy, even if incurred prior to any adversarial agency
action. 89 The Weyerhaeuser court found that requiring an insured to wait
to be sued before receiving the benefits of its insurance policy would be
inconsistent with the insured's contractual duty to mitigate damages, as
well as the public policy of encouraging prompt action to protect the
public health and environment. 9o
The Goodstein court distinguished Boeing and Weyerhaeuser from
the instant case in one crucial respect: "[t]he plaintiffs in Boeing and
Weyerhaeuser actually cleaned up the polluted land, thus remedying the
harm to the public caused by the contamination. The covered damages
were incurred as part of that effort.,,91 The sales contract for the Sternoff
properties could not be the functional equivalent of the claims in Boeing
and Weyerhaeuser when neither contract required the purchaser to
actually remediate the pollution as a condition of the sale. 92 As a result,
the Ninth Circuit affIrmed the district court's holding that Industrial had
no duty to indemnify Goodstein for the loss in sale value of the polluted
properties. 93
C.

DUTY TO DEFEND POTENTIALLY COVERED CLAlMS

Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered Goodstein's assertion that the
DOE's allegations of contamination created a duty to defend since claims
for environmental remediation are potentially covered under the
Industrial policy.94 In reversing the district court's grant of summary
judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that Goodstein invoked the duty to

terms in an insurance contract must be given their 'plain, ordinary, and popular' meaning.").
87 See Boeing, 784 P.2d at 516.
88
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994) (en bane).
89 See id. at 154.
90 See id. at 153-154.
91 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
92

[d.

See id. at 1054.
94 See id. at 1055.
93
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defend by filing the lawsuit against Industrial and that duty began at the
time of the DOE action and ended upon the sale of the properties. 95
An insurer has a duty to defend when the insurance policy
"conceivably" covers the allegations: 96 "[a]n insurer's duty to defend an
action brought against its insured arises when a complaint against the
insured, construed liberally, alleges facts which could, if proven, impose
liability upon the insured within the policy's coverage. ,,97 But Industrial
only assumes the duty to defend a "suit against the insured seeking
damages. ,,98 Whether the DOE's declaration of the Sternoff properties as
polluted constituted a "suit" within the meaning of the policy is an open
and unresolved issue under Washington law. 99 Since Industrial did not
argue that the DOE action was not a "suit," the Ninth Circuit declined to
resolve the issue,loo and instead, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the DOE
designation of the properties was a "SUit."IOI So assuming, the Goodstein
court ruled that "environmental response costs can constitute covered
'damages' under CGL policies" and held that the DOE action implicated
Industrial's duty to defend. 102
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are separate
obligations, and courts examine them independently. 103 Therefore, the
fact that Goodstein did not pay any response costs is irrelevant to
whether a duty to defend existed while those costs were potentially
payable. I04 The court only looks to whether the claims asserted against
the insured were potentially covered under the policy.105 "An insurer's
duty to defend is a continuing one, and does not end until the underlying
action is resolved or it is shown that there is no potential for
coverage."I06 As such, the Goodstein court found that when Goodstein
sold the properties without performing remediation, he converted the
response costs, which were potentially covered under the policies, into an

1d. at 1060.
See id. at lOSS (citing Woo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 164 P.3d 454, 459 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc».
97 Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
98 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).
99 See id. at 1055.
100 See id.
95

96

101/d.

(emphasis added).
See id. (citing Dewitt Constr. Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2002».
104 See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055.
105 See id.
102/d.

103

106 Overton v. Con sol. Ins. Co., 38 P.3d 322, 344 (Wash. 2002) (en bane) (quoted in
Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 8

POLLUTION PROPERTY DAMAGE

2008]

542

economic loss that clearly fell outside the scope of coverage. I07 Thus,
Industrial's duty to defend began at the time of the DOE action and
terminated when Goodstein sold the properties. 108 The Ninth Circuit
held that if Goodstein can establish a breach of the duty to defend, he
will be able to recover any pre-transfer costs incurred in defending,
including any costs incurred in investigating the environmental
contamination, such as the costs of hiring an expert to assess the
pollution. 109
i.

invocation of the Duty to Defend

Goodstein asserted that his September 28, 1990 letter invoked the
duty to defend because it gave Industrial notice of the fact that the DOE
had declared the properties polluted. llD However, Washington law
requires more than just providing notice to the insurer of a claim: III "the
insured must affIrmatively inform the insurer that its participation is
desired." I 12 The Goodstein court found that Goodstein had done the
opposite; Goodstein made clear that he was not invoking coverage under
the policies. ll3 In his October 22, 1990 letter, Goodstein specifically
stated that he was "not presently making any claims under the
policies." 114
Industrial asserted that no showing of prejudice was necessary
because Goodstein never invoked the duty to defend in the first place. 115
While the Ninth Circuit found Industrial's position to be creative, the
court was not persuaded. ll6 Under Washington's late notice rule, in
order to avoid liability for defense costs, an insurer must prove that the
insured's delay in tendering the defense claim caused the insurer actual
and substantial prejudice. 117
107
108

See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055.
[d. at 1056.

109 The measure of damages for a breach of the duty to defend is the costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by the insured in defending itself plus any consequential damages as a result
of the breach; see id. at 1058 n.20 (quoting Underwriters at Lloyds v. Denali Seafoods, Inc., 927
F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court found that the discounted sales price could not have been
caused by Industrial's failure to defend because Goodstein did not invoke the duty to defend until he
filed this lawsuit, which was after he had already sold the properties for the discounted price; see id.
110 See Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007).
III See id.
112

[d. (quoting Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d II SO, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)).

113

See id.

See
See
116 See
117 See
114

115

id. at 1048; see also id. at 1056.
Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1056.
id. at 1056.
Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2(07) (citing Mutual
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The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that Goodstein may never have
tendered a defense claim to Industrial before filing this lawsuit did not
relieve Industrial of its obligation to prove prejudice. 118 The court held
that "[t]he filing of the lawsuit itself constitutes a request for payment of
defense costs under the policy, and at that point, the late notice rule
applies.,,119 The court found that Goodstein's failure to deman a defense
precluded coverage absent a showing of prejudice. 120 "[E]ven if a claim
for defense costs is ... asserted in the form of a coverage suit rather than
by a letter to the insurer demanding a defense or submitting defense
costs, the insurance company is still liable for the defense costs absent
evidence of substantial prejudice." 121
2.

Evidence of Substantial Prejudice

The Ninth Circuit held that Industrial could not establish prejudice
as a matter of law. 122 To establish prejudice, Industrial had to
"demonstrate some concrete detriment, some specific advantage lost or
disadvantage created, which hard] an identifiable prejudicial effect on
[Industrial's] ability to evaluate, prepare or present its defenses to
coverage or liability.,,123 The court found that there was no evidence to
suggest that Industrial could have taken any steps to mitigate or dispute
Goodstein's liability for the pollution or that Industrial was in any other
way damaged by Goodstein's alleged breach of its obligations under the
policy. 124 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for Industrial on the duty to defend claim. 125
The Goodstein court, however, emphasized that this decision was
not expressing a view on whether Industrial actually owed a duty to
defend under the policies. 126 Rather, the decision merely established that
Industrial could not prove substantial prejudice as a matter of law to
warrant the grant of summary judgment. 127 The Ninth Circuit left it up to
of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 877, 882 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Public Utility Dist.
No. I of Klickitat County v. Int'I Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Griffin v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777, 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)).
118 [d. at 1058.
119 [d. at 1057.
120 [d. at 1058.
121/d. (relying on Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 877, 882 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2007)).
122 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).
123 [d. (citing Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)).
124 See id. at 1059.
I2S Id. at 1060.
126 See id.
127 See id.
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the district court, on remand, to determine whether there was a duty to
defend based on these facts, and, if so, whether any damages were
incurred as a result of the breach. 128
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit decision in Goodstein v. Continental Casualty
Co. stands for the proposition that the diminished sale value of polluted
property is not a covered "property damage" under a CGL policy where
the sale contract did not require the buyer to remediate as a condition of
the sale. 129 This holding appears to be consistent with Washington law;
by selling the property "as is" and without requiring the buyer to clean
up the property, Goodstein did not actually pay any sums it was
obligated to pay under the MTCA or CERLCA. 130
More significant, however, is the Ninth Circuit's treatment of what
constitutes a "suit" for purposes of the duty to defend. In finding that
Industrial might still have a duty to defend Goodstein, the Ninth Circuit
assumed that the DOE action was a "suit" for purposes of defining the
insurer's defense obligations under the CGL policy.13I In the words of
the Goodstein court, what constitutes a "suit" for purposes of the duty to
defend in environmental cleanup cases is an issue that the Washington
Supreme Court has "repeatedly declined to resolve.,,132
However, by proceeding to find a duty to defend under the
assumption that mere designation of property as polluted is a "suit"
under a CGL policy, the Goodstein court may have opened the door for
policyholders who have cleaned up property without putting their
insurers on notice to claim retroactive payments for site investigation
costs. 133 In addition, as one commentator stated, "[b]y the court's own
logic, that 'suit' would not terminate until the property was fully
remediated and removed from the cleanup list. Until [the DOE] does so,
the 'suit' would remain active and Goodstein would remain exposed to
enforcement by the state and potential contribution actions by subsequent
owners. ,,134
128

See id.

See Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d \042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007).
130 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 151 (Wash. 1994) (en
129

bane).
See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055.
See id.
133 Linda Larson & Dustin Till, Marten Law Group, Ninth Circuit Decides the Diminished
Value of Contaminated Sites Is Not Covered by Insurance under Washington Law (January 30,
2008), http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20080 130-contaminated-sites.
134 Linda Larson & Dustin Till, Marten Law Group, Ninth Circuit Decides the Diminished
\31

\32
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The Washington Supreme Court's en banc decision In
Weyerhaeuser took a step closer to finding that mere designation of
property as polluted without an overt threat of litigation is a "suit" within
the meaning of a CGL policy. 135 Goodstein expands on Weyerhaeuser in
holding that a duty to defend may exist based on the mere designation of
property by an environmental agency.136 Whether Washington courts or
other jurisdictions will follow the Goodstein court's assumption that
mere designation by an environmental agency constitutes a "suit"
remains to be seen.

DANIEL S. CHO*

Value of Contaminated Sites Is Not Covered by Insurance under Washington Law (January 30,
2008), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsl?20080 130-contaminated-sites.
135 See Weyerhaeuser, 874 P.2d at 154 (finding coverage under a CGL policy "where there
has been property damage and where a policyholder is liable pursuant to an environmental statute.").
136 See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
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